Legal approaches to the burial rights of a surviving wife by Nwabueze, Remigius N.
12
Amicus Curiae Issue 73 Spring 2008
INTRODUCTION
Most mortuary cultures sentimentalise the deadbody of a departed relative (Richardson, 2006).Legal systems accommodate these sentiments
through the development of appropriate legal protections.
But the task of couching the needed protection in precise
legal terms and categories has proved to be a daunting
exercise. For instance, even though nervous shock is not
generally remediable in English law, the English Court of
Appeal had to grapple with the propriety of remedying
shock (in damages) resulting from the disturbance of a
coffin enclosing a dead body when the hearse carrying it
was involved in an accident (Owens v Liverpool Corporation
[1939] 1 KB 394). In Louisville & NR Co v Wilson, 51 S.E.
24, 25; Ga. 1905, a US court captured the enormity of the
legal challenge posed by dead bodies:
“Death is unique. It is unlike aught else in its certainty and
its incidents. A corpse in some respects is the strangest thing
on earth. A man who but yesterday breathed, and thought,
and walked among us has passed away. Something has gone.
The body is left still and cold, and is all that is visible to
mortal eye of the man we knew. Around it cling love and
memory. Beyond it may reach hope. It must be laid away.
And the law – that rule of action which touches all humans
– must touch also this thing of death. It is not surprising
that the law relating to this mystery of what death leaves
behind cannot be precisely brought within the letter of all
rules regarding corn, lumber, and pig-iron.”
The problem of legal regulation is probably felt more in
the selection of the person entitled to determine the time,
place and manner of burial of a deceased relative. More
especially, do legal systems recognise the right of a surviving
wife to control the disposition of her husband’s remains?
Much depends on the particular legal system. Sepulchral
regimes vary significantly between the North and South
and between western and non-western civilisations.
WOMEN IN WESTERN LEGAL SYSTEMS
Most western legal systems recognize the right of a
surviving wife to control the disposition of the remains of
her deceased husband. In the USA, the surviving wife is the
appropriate person to determine the time, manner and
place of burial of her deceased husband. Although she is
expected to take the wishes of other members of the family
into consideration, her own sepulchral wishes are
controlling and paramount in the event of a conflict. In this
way the prioritization of a widow’s right to bury her
deceased husband reinforces her pre-eminent status as the
closest person to the deceased (at least formally). It also
gives acute expression to the binding character of marriage
and the precedence that it attracts in family relations. But
the American widow is not given priority at all cost and in
all circumstances. For instance, a widow’s priority is
subject to the burial wishes of her deceased husband. If the
decedent’s sepulchral wishes are ascertainable and clear,
American courts will enforce them. Accordingly, the
widow’s priority is lost where the deceased husband gave
particular directions regarding the disposition of his
remains. Whether these mortuary directions were actually
given and what their contents are would always remain
questions of fact and the answer would depend on the
surrounding circumstances of each case.
Nevertheless, an American man may make stipulations
in his will regarding the manner of his burial and these will
be given legal effect even though they are contrary to the
wishes of the widow. It is also immaterial that the
testamentary direction contradicts the hallowed
proposition that the human body is not property in the
ordinary sense of the term and, therefore, not capable of
testamentary disposition. Moreover, burial directions in a
will are likely to be enforced even though the will is invalid
and unenforceable. Likewise, testamentary directions on
disposition of remains may be revoked informally, without
the execution of another will, codicil, or other written
instrument. An American man may express his burial
wishes in other forms apart from in a will; for instance, by
filling relevant forms with a funeral home or by simply
signing a written burial directive. Indeed, parol directions
given by a decedent regarding the manner of his burial will
be given effect against the contrary wishes of the surviving
wife.
In addition to the overriding effect given to the
deceased’s wishes, an American widow will lose her
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sepulchral priority if she was divorced from the deceased at
the time of his death. In some states in the USA, even mere
judicial separation or evidence of bad relationship between
the deceased and the surviving wife may engender loss of
priority. These situations challenge the presumption of
closeness and her claims to sentimental attachment (to the
deceased) which sepulchral priority tries to vindicate.
Except in the above circumstances, a surviving wife has the
unquestionable right to control the disposition of her
deceased husband to the exclusion of other people. As
such, the American sepulchral framework is highly
individualised but it has its advantages. It ensures that in
the event of a family dispute (which is common these days)
over the right to determine the time, manner and place of
burial of the deceased (her husband), her decisional
authority to do so is not in doubt. This certainty avoids
unnecessary litigation between family members which
would exacerbate the grief arising from the death of the
husband. But this approach carries the disadvantage of
insensitivity to the legitimate wishes of other family
members who did not agree with the widow’s general plan
for burial. Where there is no love lost between a widow
and her deceased husband’s relatives, the paramountcy of
her sepulchral right provides an opportunity for mischief;
she could arrange burial at a time and place that guarantees
the non-attendance of the deceased’s relatives. She could
also arrange burial in a manner that is religiously or
culturally offensive to those relatives. For instance, she
could authorise the cremation of her husband’s remains in
order to assault the sensibility of her in-laws (the deceased
relatives) whose traditional or spiritual beliefs in life after
death ordain burial of the body intact.
The position is not much different in the UK, Australia,
and Canada. Sepulchral prioritisation in these jurisdictions
is still marked by their individualisation. Paramountcy,
however, is accorded to the wishes of the executor or the
deceased’s legal representative rather than the surviving
wife, except she is also the deceased’s executrix. It beats
one’s imagination why the executor rather than the
surviving wife should have the decisional authority over the
disposal of the remains of the deceased. This curiosity can
only be satisfied by an excursion into legal history and by
unpacking the common law’s (mis)treatment of married
women. Until 125 years ago, the English common law
hardly regarded a married woman as having an identity
separate from her husband. Her chattels were his. She
could not have any estate of her own, except with a few
equitable exceptions; and she was socially and practically
considered to be her husband’s property. In such an
economic and social state, it would have been unwise for
the common law to impose on her the duty of burying her
husband which involved great financial outlay. It is no
surprise that since her husband owned his wealth as well as
hers, the common law imposed a duty on the husband to
bury his wife (at least until recently) (Rees v Hughes [1946]
1 KB 517). On the husband’s death, and the wife surviving
him, his executor steps into his shoes for the purposes of
administration. With the wherewithal to bear the funeral
expenses, the executor assumes the duty of burial and the
right that comes with it. For this reason, the funeral
expenses are considered to be a first charge on the estate
of the deceased. It would have been absurd to expect a
surviving wife in the economic and legal conditions of 18th
century England to shudder the responsibility of burying
her husband. So, the common law rule preferring the
executor to the wife has deep historical underpinnings.
In practice, however, there is hardly any conflict. Most
executors are sensitive to the wishes of the surviving wife.
Except where the deceased gave burial directions which an
executor feels morally obliged to comply with, the time,
manner and place of burial will normally be chosen
consistently with the wishes of the surviving spouse. But as
regards strict legal interpretation, a surviving wife has no
remedy against an executor who is determined to ignore
her burial wishes in relation to her deceased husband.
Indeed, the executor can even ignore the deceased’s
mortuary directions (Williams v Williams [1882] 20 Ch D
659). The lot of the married woman improved a little bit
with the passage of the Married Women’s Property Act,
1882 (and similar statutes passed after that). That Act
recognized a married woman as capable of owning
property just like her husband; but it did not project her to
sepulchral priority – it is still the executor’s. If the Act had
any impact in the burial realm, it was to relieve the
husband of the duty of burying his wife (Rees v Hughes).
Since a wife can now have her own separate estate and
property of her own, her funeral expenses are defrayed
from her estate. Her new property status means that a
married woman can validly make a will to dispose of her
property and, for that purpose, to appoint an executor. Just
like her husband, her executor has the duty of burying her
and the right to determine the time, manner and place of
her burial. She is now on equal footing with her husband.
Where there is no executor and a dispute arises as to who
is entitled to control the disposition of the remains of the
deceased, some cases suggest that it is the legal
representative or (absent that) the person entitled to be
appointed the deceased’s administrator or administratrix
(Buchanan v Milton [1999] 2 FLR 844; Jones v Dodd [1999]
73 SASR 328; Smith v Tamworth City Council [1997] 41
NSWLR 680). The administration of estates laws of most
countries give preference to the surviving wife in the
choice of an administrator of the estate of the intestate.
Such laws indirectly protect the right of a widow to control
the disposition of her husband’s remains. One thing,
however, is clear. In the UK, USA, Canada, and Australia,
the decisional authority over the burial of a family member
is the prerogative of a single person. The framework of
regulation is rights-based. In those jurisdictions, the
individualisation of sepulchral rights is beyond cavil and it
contrasts sharply with the position in many African
countries. 13
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SURVIVING WIVES IN AFRICA
Burial regime in many African countries is group-based
in contradistinction to the rights-based approach of most
western legal systems. In most systems of customary law in
Africa, no individual can claim the sole right to determine
the time, place and manner of burial of a deceased family
member. Burial is a family affair. The duty of burial belongs
to the family as a whole. The head of a family has the
responsibility of coordinating and managing the funeral
arrangements for the burial of a deceased member. In
some respects, the head of a family is like a trustee; he
exercises the right of burial for the benefit of every family
member. Since a woman cannot become the head of a
family in many African countries, she is logically excluded
from controlling the disposition of her husband’s remains.
There are a few exceptions though. For instance, among
the Yorubas of western Nigeria a strong and influential
senior female member of a family might be selected to
head the family (Taiwo v. Sarumi [1913] 2 NLR 103; Elias,
1971, 104-05). Accordingly, where a woman’s husband
dies, the right of burial does not belong to her, but to the
family of her deceased husband. In that case, the head of
family may be a father, brother or uncle of the deceased.
The surviving wife is obliged to acquiesce in the family’s
decision regarding burial. Her position is even more
tenuous in some customary law systems where the
surviving wife could be inherited by one of her husband’s
relatives.
It is at once obvious that the African group-based
approach to sepulchral rights is problematical. It conflicts
with notions of equality in constitutional democracies, as
well as conflicting inexorably with the frameworks of most
human rights instruments which reflect the rights-based
possessive individualism of western civilisation
(Macpherson, 1962). Moreover, the familial approach in
Africa has its roots in customary law whose patriarchal
origins naturally render it less receptive to women’s rights.
Sepulchral priority under customary is open to abuse. It
might provide an opportunity for disgruntled in-laws to
“settle scores” with a widow. It is not uncommon in many
African countries that when a man dies and is survived by
his wife (or only female children), his relatives swoop on
his property under a claim of entitlement to his estate
recognised by customary law. Thus, the widow is
dispossessed and disinherited. There was even a Nigerian
case where a widow was threatened by her father-in-law
that unless she declared and relinquished claims to her
husband’s property she would be visited with the
misfortune of leaving her husband’s corpse in the rain and
unburied (Moses, 2005).
A Kenyan Court of Appeal case brings these difficulties
(under customary law) into bold relief. In Otieno v Ougo
[1982-87] 1 KAR 1049, the claimant widow was a high-
profile politician in Kenya while her deceased husband was
a famous criminal lawyer. The husband died intestate and a
dispute arose between the widow and her in-laws as to the
place of interment. The widow wanted her husband to be
buried in the city of Nairobi where both had lived and
worked for many years. The deceased brothers and
relatives wanted him to be buried in the village (ancestral
home) in accordance with the customs of their people. The
widow won at the trial court but the in-laws went to the
Court of Appeal where the issue boiled down to which
system of law was applicable, customary or English-type
laws and legislation? The Kenyan Court of Appeal observed
that it must be guided by customary law unless the
application of customary law proved to be repugnant to
justice and morality or inconsistent with a written law.
According to the Court of Appeal, the main reason the
received English common law was not applicable was
because its application was subject to the limits of local
circumstances under section 3 of the Judicature Act, cap 8.
Since there was a clear customary law relating to burial in
Kenya, the Court of Appeal argued, “the common law will
not fit the circumstances of Kenya” (1056). Even if the
common law were applicable, the Court of Appeal further
observed, the husband’s executor rather than the claimant
widow would be entitled to the right arising from the duty
of burial (1058-1059). Since the deceased (husband) died
intestate the claimant widow could not claim to be an
executor (as there was no will appointing her an executrix);
and her application for letters of administration having not
been determined as at the time of the judgment of the
Court of Appeal, she could not claim as an administratrix.
The Court of Appeal surmised that her application
would invariably have failed even if customary law were not
applicable. Under the applicable Luo customary law, burial
is invariably in the village unless the deceased, during his
life time, performed a particular customary ceremony
which demonstrated his intention to be buried in a place
other than his ancestral home (the ceremony was not
performed in Otieno’s case). On the argument that the
deceased’s western life-style, profession, sophistication
and urbanisation took him out of the regulation of
customary mortuary law, the Court of Appeal observed:
“At present there is no way in which an African citizen of
Kenya can divest himself of the association with the tribe of
his father if those customs are patrilineal. It is thus clear that
Mr Otieno having been born and bred a Luo remained a
member of the Luo tribe and subject to the customary law of
the Luo people. The Luos are patrilineal people.” (at 1054).
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed the widow’s
case and allowed her husband’s relatives to bury him
according to their customs and tradition. The case is often
thought to be a sign of victory for the resilience of
customary law, but it rather signals a progressive trend that
will climax in the very near future: African women,
especially the educated ones, are not likely to accept the
regulation of a discriminatory system of customary law
without question (Stamp, 1991; Doren, 1988). It should
be said, however, that shorn of the exclusionary uses of the
group-based approach to burial rights, the African14
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mortuary priority system is superior to the rights-based
approach in many western societies. Most family issues in
Africa are based on negotiation and reconciliation; it is not
a winner-takes-it-all approach characteristic of the
possessive individualism of western democracies and their
sepulchral regime. Under customary law, family cohesion
is more important than the rights of individual members.
Provided the wishes of an African widow are respected and
factored into the burial equation, the disposition of the
remains of her husband is likely to have a familial character
that satisfies every member of the family. It will also be
consistent with the belief in Africa that the death of a
relative is a loss to the entire family.
EXCLUDING CUSTOMARY MORTUARY LAW
Otieno’s case suggests that an African cannot opt-out (or
contract out) of customary law except within the limits
imposed by customary law, such as by performing a
ceremony which evinces the celebrant’s intention to be
buried in a place of his choosing (other than his ancestral
home). This statement, however, should be taken with
some caution since the deceased in that case did not make
a will and the court refused to accept the claimant’s
evidence relating to her husband’s intention to be buried in
the city of Nairobi. It seems that the application of
customary law, including customary mortuary law, will be
excluded by English-type transactions such as the making
of a will (Nwabueze, 2002). In that case, the executor is
the appropriate person to take charge of the deceased, and
where the surviving wife is also the executrix, customary
mortuary law will certainly pose no problem for her. She
would simply use her right as an executrix to realise her
own personal burial wishes. Secondly, where the deceased
died intestate the surviving wife is preferred in the grant of
letters of administration under the succession or
administration of estate laws of most African countries. As
an administratrix the law gives her the custody of the
deceased for burial. A surviving wife in Africa wishing to
exclude the application of customary mortuary rules is
well-advised to get letters of administration. But the grant
may not come in good time for burial, especially where the
widow’s application for letters of administration is
opposed by her husband’s relative, as in Otieno’s case. In
that case the Kenyan Court of Appeal held that while the
widow would be preferred in the grant of letters of
administration, she could not claim any right under it since
the grant had not yet been made at the time of the action.
In such circumstances, customary law will fill the gap, to
the chagrin of the surviving wife.
The application of customary mortuary law could also
be contested on constitutional grounds. A widow could
argue that her exclusion by customary burial practices
discriminate against her as a female. She could even argue
that the right to bury her husband is a property right; its
violation amounts to a deprivation of property under the
constitution. This latter argument is likely to confront the
common law rule that there is no property right in the
dead body of a human being (Nwabueze, 2007). The
equality argument or right against sex-based discrimination
was raised in Otieno’s case. The Court of Appeal, however,
held that sections 82(3) and (4)(b) of the Kenyan
Constitution expressly permit discriminatory burial rules
(at 1060). This type of constitutional exemption is likely to
pose problems for African States that signed onto the 1979
General Assembly’s UN Convention on the Elimination of
All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
Article 2 (f) of the Convention imposes an obligation on
signatory states to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices that constitute
discrimination against women. Even in constitutional
systems where the equality clause is all-encompassing or
does not exempt any type of discrimination, a surviving
wife might still have problems in challenging customary
law on constitutional grounds, for instance against the
actions of her deceased husband’s relatives. They (the
widow’s in-laws) could argue that fundamental human
rights have only a vertical and not a horizontal application.
In other words, such rights apply only to actions brought
by individuals against the state but not to actions between
private persons. This is a concededly controversial issue
(Nwabueze, 2007), and means that a surviving wife’s
constitutional remedies are very uncertain.
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